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EQUITABLE MOOTNESS IN BANKRUPTCY
APPEALS
Katelyn Knight*

I. INTRODUCTION
The right of a litigant to have the litigant's case heard by
a fair and impartial judge, isolated from political and social
pressures, lies at the heart of American law. Article III of the
United States Constitution establishes the federal judiciary
as a distinct and independent branch of government.' The
independence of the judiciary serves the dual purpose of
safeguarding a litigant's right to have claims heard by a judge
free from potential domination, and maintaining separation
of powers among the three branches of government.2 While
the prototypical judge is granted power to adjudicate disputes
by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, a bankruptcy judge is
granted that power by Congress, pursuant to Article I.
The jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts is constrained by
In response to Congress's enactment of the
Article III.
* Senior Articles Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 49; J.D. Candidate
2009, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.S. Business Administration,
University of Colorado at Boulder. Thanks to Professor Gary Neustadter for his
guidance and insight, Daniel J. Artz for the topic, and my family for their
support.
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848
(1986).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Courts granted power by Congress are
commonly referred to as Article I courts, while those granted power under
Article III of the Constitution are referred to as Article III courts. The main
distinction between the two is that Article III courts are truly independent and
serve to check the other branches, whereas Article I courts can theoretically be
shut down by Congress at any time. The differences between the two courts are
discussed later on in the comment. See, e.g., discussion infra Part II.
4. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
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Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the "1978 Act"),' which
significantly expanded the jurisdiction of bankruptcy judges,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that Article III
requires the "essential attributes of judicial power" to be
exercised exclusively by the judicial branch.6 This has been
interpreted to mean that an Article III court has the
"appearance and reality of control . . . over interpretation,
declaration, and application of federal law."7 Subsequent
bankruptcy legislation attempted to remedy the 1978 Act's
constitutional shortcomings8 by designating bankruptcy
courts as "units" of the district courts, 9 giving district courts
the option of referring cases to the bankruptcy units,' ° and
giving litigants a right to appeal bankruptcy judges' decisions
to an Article III court." These safeguards help to maintain
the independent judiciary. However, the doctrine of equitable
mootness as recently applied allows bankruptcy courts to
effectively exercise judicial power, threatening litigants' right
to review by an independent Article III court.
The doctrine of equitable mootness causes two related
problems.
First, it allows district courts to avoid their
obligation to exercise jurisdiction granted to them by
Congress.
Second, it allows the bankruptcy court to
effectively dismiss an appeal without review on the merits by
a judicial court, thereby depriving litigants of their
constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard by an
independent adjudicator."
Under this doctrine, a district
court will decline to hear an appeal on the merits, despite
having the power to grant effective relief, if events or
transactions have taken place, pending appeal, which make it
"inequitable" to grant relief." Because the factors considered
5. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)).
6. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87
(1982) (plurality opinion).
7. Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic, Inc. v. Instromedix, 725 F.2d 537, 544
(9th Cir. 1984)).
8. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 78-87 (discussing why the 1978
Act was unconstitutional).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 305 (2000).
12. See discussion infra Part IV.F.
13. In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 558-59 (3d Cir. 1996).
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when determining whether an appeal is equitably moot are
effectively within the control of the bankruptcy court, 14 an
Article I judge can determine whether a litigant is able to
obtain review by an Article III judge. This undermines the
protections afforded by separation of powers in government,
tending to do the most harm to litigants with meritorious
appeals.
This comment examines the doctrine of equitable
mootness and its effect on a litigant's ability to obtain review
by an Article III court. Part II of this comment provides a
brief overview of the constitutional issues arising from
bankruptcy legislation, a brief overview of the bankruptcy
process, and an introduction to the doctrine of equitable
mootness. 15 Part III identifies the problems presented by
equitable mootness, which allows district courts to avoid their
obligations and allows bankruptcy courts to effectively decide
when an appeal will be heard, both of which deprive litigants
of their right to review by an Article III court.' 6 Part IV
discusses the doctrine of equitable mootness as applied in the
case of In re ContinentalAirlines.17 It goes on to examine the
legitimacy of equitable mootness, the district courts'
obligation to exercise the jurisdiction granted to them by
statute, the mechanism by which bankruptcy courts deprive
litigants of review by an Article III court, the constitutional
issue raised by broad application of the doctrine, and briefly,
how a sophisticated party might take advantage of the
doctrine.'" Finally, Part V proposes two procedural rules that
would prevent the occurrence of events or transactions that
cause an appeal to be dismissed on mootness grounds.1 9
II. BACKGROUND
Article I of the United States Constitution expressly
grants Congress the power "to establish . . uniform laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."20
Congress passed the first federal bankruptcy act pursuant to

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553; see infra Part V.A.
See infra Part IV.B-G.
See infra Part V.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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this power in 1800, but repealed the act after only three
years.2 1 Throughout the nineteenth century, Congress made
several additional attempts to pass workable bankruptcy
laws,22 but repealed each new law shortly after it came into
effect.23
In 1898, Congress passed the longest running
bankruptcy law in U.S. history.
The Bankruptcy Act of
1898 (the "1898 Act") was effective for eighty years before
being supplanted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.25
A. JurisdictionalIssues of the Bankruptcy Acts
Since the inception of the 1898 Act, bankruptcy courts
have had limited jurisdiction.2 6 In 1968, sentiment had
grown that bankruptcy law in the United States was in need
of reform.2 7 Congress created a review commission to study,
evaluate, and recommend changes to the 1898 Act.28 After a
decade of study and debate, Congress passed the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 (the "1978 Act").29
One major point of debate leading up to the bankruptcy
bill's passage concerned the limited jurisdiction of bankruptcy
courts.3" The 1978 Act sought to remedy, among other things,
these perceived jurisdictional limitations.3
In comparison to

21. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 14 (1995).
22. Id. at 16-23.
23. After the first bankruptcy act was repealed in 1803, Congress passed
the Act of 1841, which was repealed two years later, followed by the Act of 1867,
which was amended in 1874 and repealed in 1878. Id. at 16-22.
24. See id. at 14-23.
25. Id. at 23.
26. See In re J.M. Wells, Inc., 575 F.2d 329, 331 (1st Cir. 1978).
27. Tabb, supra note 21, at 32.
28. Id. at 33.
29. Id. at 34.
30. Id.
31. A major weakness of the 1898 Act was its splintered jurisdictional
scheme, in which bankruptcy judges could only hear certain core matters. Id.
Congress obviously believed that it could vest bankruptcy courts with additional
power to solve the problem. The Supreme Court has recognized that:
[Wlhen Congress creates a substantive federal right, it possesses
substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which that right may
be adjudicated-including the assignment to an adjunct of some
functions historically performed by judges ....

[T]he functions of the

adjunct must be limited in such a way that "the essential attributes" of
judicial power are retained in the Article III courts.
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 80-81 (1982)
(plurality opinion).
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the 1898 Act, the 1978 Act granted expansive and
unprecedented additional powers to bankruptcy judges. The
Act expanded the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction to allow
bankruptcy judges to rule on "virtually any matter arising in,
or related to the bankruptcy case."32 The Act's substantial
structural changes to the bankruptcy judiciary led to a
prompt constitutional challenge.
In the 1982 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co. decision,3 3 the Supreme Court ruled
that the 1978 Act unconstitutionally allowed bankruptcy
judges to exercise powers reserved to the judicial branch by
Article III of the United States Constitution.3 4 Article III of
the U.S. Constitution serves to safeguard a litigant's "right to
have claims decided by judges who are free from potential
domination by other branches of government." 35
As
interpreted by the Supreme Court, Article III allows
legislative courts to make some factual determinations. 6 But
to pass constitutional muster, the functions of the legislative
court must be limited such that the essential attributes of
judicial power remain vested in an Article III court. 3' The
Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. found that
Article III barred Congress from passing the 1978 Act,
because the broad grant of jurisdiction impermissibly vested
the essential attributes of judicial power in a non-Article III
court.3
An Article III court must retain the essential
attributes of judicial power to protect litigants' constitutional
rights and the structure of government in the United States. 9
Realizing the far-reaching implications of its decisionwhich would have effectively stalled the processing of all
bankruptcy cases in the United States until Congress
remedied the 1978 Act-the Supreme Court voluntarily

32. Tabb, supra note 21, at 34; see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at
56 (a company filed suit in bankruptcy court for breach of contract, warranty,
misrepresentation, coercion, and duress shortly after a reorganization).
33. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
34. Id. at 87.
35. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980); See also N. Pipeline
Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 77 ("[T]he power to adjudicate 'private rights' must be
vested in an Art. III court....").
36. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 81.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 87.
39. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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stayed its own decision for a period of five months in order to
allow Congress to pass a new bankruptcy bill.4 ° In 1984,
more than two years after the Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. decision, Congress amended the Act.4 1 The Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (the "1984
Act") designated bankruptcy courts as "units" of the district
courts.4 2 Under the new system, the district courts retain
original and exclusive jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases,4" but
each district court has the option of referring those cases to
bankruptcy units.4 4 Every district court in the United States
except the District of Delaware has a standing order to refer
bankruptcy cases to its bankruptcy division.4 5
The 1984 Act addressed several aspects of constitutional
concern contained in the 1978 Act, but it left others
untouched. For instance, the 1984 Act left in place a statute
that allowed bankruptcy courts to dismiss cases without
appeal to any other court,4 6 thereby depriving litigants of the
opportunity to be heard directly by an Article III judge. This
was resolved in the case of In re Parklane/Atlanta Joint
Venture, in which the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that this provision was unconstitutional and
held that "such a dismissal must be made by an [Article III
court]. ''4 The court reasoned that allowing a bankruptcy
40. Tabb, supra note 21, at 38.
41. Id. at 38-39. The statute was amended again in 1990 to allow review by
a district court, but not a circuit court or the United States Supreme Court. 11
U.S.C. § 305 (2000) ("An order under subsection (a) of this section dismissing a
case or suspending all proceedings in a case, or a decision not so to dismiss or
suspend, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise by the court of appeals under
section 158(d), 1291, or 1292 of title 28 or by the Supreme Court of the United
States under section 1254 of title 28.").
42. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2000).
7
44. 28 U.S.C. § 15 (a) (2000).
45. The District of Delaware revoked its standing orders of reference to its
bankruptcy units with regard to Chapter 11 cases. The judge for a Chapter 11
filing in Delaware is now drawn from a pool of district and bankruptcy judges.
Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction:A General
Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 927 n.639

(2000).
46. 11 U.S.C. § 305 (1988) (amended 1990) ("An order under subsection (a)
of this section dismissing a case or suspending all proceedings in a case, or a
decision not so to dismiss or suspend, is not reviewable by appeal or
otherwise.").
re
(In
Venture
Co.
v. Parklane/Atlanta
Hosiery
47. Parklane
Parklane/Atlanta Joint Venture), 927 F.2d 532, 536 (11th Cir. 1991).
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court to dismiss a case under the statute would place the
jurisdiction of an Article III court within the discretion of an
Article I court, thereby allowing a non-Article III court to
effectively exercise judicial power.4"
In re Parklane was a significant case in part because it
set the limit for the extent to which a district court could
delegate its power. The 1984 amendments placed original
jurisdiction over bankruptcy disputes with the district courts
and established bankruptcy courts as units of the district
courts.4 9 The 1984 amendments allowed the district courts to
delegate a certain amount of their responsibility to the
bankruptcy courts, but the district courts could not be
relieved of their obligation to supervise the bankruptcy
courts.5 ° It is well established that "[w]hen a Federal court is
properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law
jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction. " "
Ultimately, litigants must be able to have their cases
reviewed by a district court in order for the courts to satisfy
the obligation to exercise the jurisdiction granted them by
Congress, as well as to ensure that judicial power is exercised
by an Article III court.
In re Parklane also clarified the relative unimportance of
the public versus private rights distinction to the
jurisdictional issues. The United States Supreme Court has
generally held that when the legislative branch creates a
public right,5 2 it may assign the adjudication of that right to
an administrative agency or Article I court.53
For
traditionally private rights (such as the contract dispute at
issue in Northern Pipeline Construction Co.), however, the
parties have the right to present their case before an Article
48. Id. at 538.
49. Id. at 535.
50. Id. at 535, 538.
51. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 475 U.S. 411, 415 (1964)
(quoting Wilcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909)).
52. The legislative branch creates a public right when, acting pursuant to
its Article I powers, it creates "a seemingly private right that is so closely
integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for
agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary."
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989).
53. Id. at 51; see also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568, 583 (1985) ("Congress is not barred from acting pursuant to its powers
under Article I to vest decisionmaking authority in tribunals that lack the
attributes of Article III courts.").
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III court.5 4 In Northern Pipeline Construction Co., Justice
Brennan, writing for the plurality, left open the question of
whether even a dispute involving public rights might require
review by an Article III court. 55 The court in In re Parklane
emphasized that the restructuring of debtor/creditor relations
had never been held to be a public right, and that a majority
of the United States Supreme Court had never endorsed a
bright-line public-versus-private-rights test to determine
whether review by an Article III tribunal was necessary.5 6
The Court basically dismissed the distinction as unimportant
to the issue of whether the restructuring of debtor/creditor
rights must be subject to review by an Article III court,
deciding the case on the grounds that allowing a bankruptcy
court to dismiss a case without review by an Article III court
would allow a bankruptcy court to exercise judicial power."
B. The Bankruptcy Process
Disputes involving private rights often make their way
into bankruptcy court via 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2)(B), which
allows bankruptcy judges to determine the dollar amount of
pending claims against the debtor. 5' The automatic stay is a
tool that essentially freezes the debtor's estate, giving the
bankruptcy judge a chance to decide the rights of all
interested parties. The following background will explain the
aspects of the bankruptcy process which are necessary to
grasp the procedural problem and this paper's proposed
solution.
After a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the bankruptcy
court consolidates the debtor's property into a bankruptcy
estate and an automatic stay takes effect.59 The automatic
54. Alec P. Ostrow, Constitutionality of Core Jurisdiction, 68 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 91, 95 (1994).
55. See id.
56. Parklane
Hosiery
Co. v.
Parklane/Atlanta
Venture
(In
re
Parklane/Atlanta Joint Venture), 927 F.2d 532, 537 (11th Cir. 1991).
57. Id. at 538.
58. For example, damages for breach of contract in a pending lawsuit.
59. The automatic stay broadly prohibits attempts to encumber or seize the
assets of the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C § 362(a) (2000). Preserving the
assets of the estate is frequently necessary to allow the debtor to continue
running a profitable business in the case of a reorganization, and to ensure fair
distribution of assets in the case of total liquidation. Kathryn R. Heidt, The
Automatic Stay in Environmental Bankruptcies, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69, 74
(1993).
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stay is a legal mandate that brings all attempts to collect
debts from the debtor, and all civil litigation adjudicating the
rights of the debtor, to a halt.6" Ongoing civil lawsuits are
converted to claims against the bankruptcy estate, and these
claims are subject to discharge along with the claims of any
other creditor. 6
The secured creditors6 2 of a debtor in bankruptcy have a
number of ways to look after their interests. First, the
creditors can request relief from the automatic stay, thereby
enabling them to continue collection attempts or to seize
A bankruptcy judge may grant such relief from
collateral.
the automatic stay if the debtor has no equity in the
collateral, and a successful reorganization of the debtor's
financial affairs does not require the collateral item. 64 A
second alternative involves the creditors seeking "adequate
protection."65 The purpose of adequate protection is to protect
creditors from any decrease in the value of collateral resulting
from, among other things, the automatic stay.66 The judge
may grant this relief in a variety of forms if the secured
party's interests in the collateral are not adequately
protected.
In a financial reorganization, a number of transactions
will normally take place, and some of these cannot be
undone.68 This makes it necessary for creditors to prevent the
transactions from occurring in the first place. Once the
bankruptcy court confirms a reorganization plan, the
60. A petition filed operates as a stay of"any act to collect, assess, or recover
a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (2000).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (2000).
62. A secured creditor is a creditor who in exchange for a loan or other
consideration, or subsequent to a successful lawsuit against the debtor, has
Mark G. Ledwin, The
taken a security interest in a debtor's property.
Treatment of Retrospectively Rated InsurancePolicies in Bankruptcy, 16 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 11, 16 (1999).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2000).
64. Id. § 362(d)(2).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2000).
66. Evan D. Flaschen & Michael J. Reilly, Bankruptcy Analysis of a
Financially-TroubledElectric Utility, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 135, 151-52 (1985).
67. For example, the judge can require the bankruptcy trustee to make cash
payments to the creditor, or grant an additional lien on other collateral in the
bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2000).
68. For example, the sale of the creditor's collateral. See supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
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creditors can seek a stay of the plan's implementation
pending appeal. 69 The stay must ordinarily be requested at
the bankruptcy court level first, but appellants may file a
motion for stay at the district court level if the motion states
the reason that relief was not obtained from the bankruptcy
court.7" If a stay is sought at the district court level, the court
may condition relief on the posting of a bond or other
appropriate security. 7
If granted, the stay prevents the
actions subject to the stay from being taken pursuant to the
plan until after the district court makes a final ruling on the
appeal.72
C. The Doctrine of EquitableMootness
The concept of equitable mootness is distinct from the
concept of constitutional mootness. Constitutional mootness
deals with the requirement that the judiciary only rule on live
cases and controversies.7 3 An appeal is constitutionally moot
when events have taken place, pending appeal, that make it
impossible to grant any meaningful relief.74 An appeal is
equitably moot when granting relief is possible, but
inequitable.7 5 This concept reflects an unwillingness to alter
the outcome, rather than an inability to do so.76
Determinations made by the bankruptcy court are
normally reviewed on appeal by a district court,7 7 preserving
litigants' right to have disputes involving private rights heard
by an Article III judge. This is not always the case, however.
When a district court determines that relief from the decision
of a bankruptcy court may be legally warranted, but
principles of equity bar such relief, the court will dismiss the
appeal and deny relief because the claim is held to be

69. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8005.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. "[T]he bankruptcy judge may suspend or order the continuation of other
proceedings in the case under the Code or make any other appropriate order
during the pendency of an appeal on such terms as will protect the rights of all
parties in interest." Id.
73. Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974).
74. In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 558 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Church of
Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)).
75. Id. at 558-59.
76. Id. at 559.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2000).
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"equitably moot.", 8 When a district court does this, it does not
actually reach the merits of the underlying objection to the
Article I judge's actions.7 9 This typically arises in cases where
the bankruptcy judge orders implementation
of a
8
reorganization plan or sale of assets pending appeal. " In this
situation, the appellant has generally failed to request, or has
requested and been denied, a stay of implementation." Once
the reorganization plan has been implemented, the debtor,
creditors, and/or third parties have usually taken action in
reliance on the plan. 2 On this basis, the district court
determines that it would be inequitable to disrupt the plan,
and therefore declines to consider the merits of the claim. 3
The doctrine of equitable mootness has been widely
recognized and applied in bankruptcy proceedings.8 4 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit announced a five-part
test to determine whether an appeal is equitably moot in the
case of In re Chateaugay Corp."5 The court stated:
[Slubstantial consummation of a bankruptcy plan will not
moot an appeal if all of the following circumstances exist:
(a) the court can still order some effective relief; (b) such
relief will not affect the re-emergence of the debtor as a
revitalized corporate entity; (c) such relief will not unravel
intricate transactions so as to knock the props out from
under the authorization for every transaction that has
taken place and create an unmanageable, uncontrollable
situation for the bankruptcy court; (d) the parties who
would be adversely affected by the modification have
notice of the appeal and an opportunity to participate in
the proceedings; and (e) the appellant pursued with
diligence all available remedies to obtain a stay of
execution of the objectionable order if the failure to do so

78. In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 558-59.
79. Manges v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank (In re Manges), 29 F.3d 1034, 1039
(5th Cir. 1994).
80. See, e.g., In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 997-99 (7th Cir. 1986).
81. If the appellant is granted a stay pending appeal, equitable mootness
will be inapplicable because a stay prevents the plan from being implemented.
82. See In re Sax, 796 F.2d at 998.
83. E.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of LTV Aerospace & Def.
Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of LTV Steel Co. (In re
Chateaugay Corp.), 988 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1993).
84. In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 558-59.
85. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944,
952-53 (2d Cir. 1993).
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creates a situation rendering
it inequitable to reverse the
86
orders appealed from.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted a
similar five-part test. 7
In the Third Circuit, equitable
mootness depends on:
(1) whether the reorganization plan has been substantially
consummated, (2) whether a stay has been obtained, (3)
whether the relief requested would affect the rights of the
parties not before the court, (4) whether the relief
requested would affect the success of the plan, and (5) the
public policy
of affording finality to bankruptcy
88
judgments.
The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, takes a more
holistic view and looks to the factors as providing a "backdrop
to evaluate the ultimate issue of whether a confirmation plan
has progressed to the point where effective judicial relief is no
longer a viable option." 9 These factors are given varying
degrees of importance depending on the circumstances, but a
court's chief consideration is whether the reorganization plan
has been substantially consummated.9"
III. THE PROBLEM WITH EQUITABLE MOOTNESS
Article III of the U.S. Constitution serves two purposes.
The first of those purposes upholds the structural nature of
our government.
Article III establishes an independent
judiciary, separate and distinct from the other two branches
of government, thus severing the total unity of governance
that had existed under colonial rule. 9 The second purpose is
more personal in nature, and ensures the right of litigants to
"have claims decided before judges who are free from

86. Id. (citations omitted).
87. Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir.
2001).
88. Id.
89. First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortgage Invs. v. Club Assocs. (In re
Club Assocs.), 956 F.2d 1065, 1069 n.11 (11th Cir. 1992).
90. NordhoffInvs., Inc., 258 F.3d at 185 (quoting In re PWS Holding Corp.,
228 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2000)).
91. Article III "serves . . . to protect 'the role of the independent judiciary
within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government." Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (quoting Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985)).
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potential domination by other branches of government. 9 2
This comment is concerned primarily with the latter
purpose of safeguarding litigants' right to have their claims
heard by an independent judiciary. Article III guarantees
independence of its judicial appointments by virtue of life
tenure and a constitutional assurance that a judge will retain
a set salary throughout his term.9 3 In contrast to these
strongholds of independence afforded to Article III judges,
bankruptcy judges are appointed for fourteen-year terms,9 4
with a salary that is set by statute and lacks a similar
constitutional guarantee of a fixed salary.95
Judge Alito's dissent, described below,96 illustrates the
potential problems with the equitable mootness doctrine. The
doctrine allows district courts to avoid their obligation to
exercise the jurisdiction granted them by Congress and
supervise the bankruptcy courts. The doctrine further allows
rulings by bankruptcy courts to escape Article III review,
largely due to the actions of the bankruptcy judge.97
Therefore,
equitable
mootness,
in
at least
some
circumstances, effectively places the determination as to
whether there will be review by an Article III court within the
discretion of an Article I court. This raises the question of
whether equitable mootness vests the essential attributes of
judicial power in an Article I court, making the doctrine
unconstitutional.98
The problems with equitable mootness are similar to, but
perhaps more limited than, the jurisdictional problems with
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The 1978 Act threatened
both the role of the independent judiciary and the litigant's
right to have claims decided before "judges who are free from
potential domination by other branches of government."99 If
bankruptcy courts had the power to prevent the district
courts from reviewing cases, that would threaten the
92. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980).
93. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl.2.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 152(b) (2000).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2000).
96. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1.
97. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
98. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87
(1982).
99. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986)
(quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)).
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separation of powers safeguard.
Equitable mootness
arguably threatens only the litigant's right to Article III
review, because Article III courts technically retain the power
to review decisions by the bankruptcy courts;100 they simply
choose not to exercise it.
IV. THE DOCTRINE AS APPLIED AND RESULTING
HARM
While most circuit courts claim that the appellant's
failure to request a stay at the bankruptcy court level does
not automatically render the appeal moot, failure to obtain a
stay is practically decisive of the equitable mootness issue in
some circuits.' 1
The bankruptcy code does not require
parties to seek a stay pending appeal, except in the case of
the sale or lease of property in the bankruptcy estate by the
trustee to a good-faith purchaser or lessee (such transactions
are valid and irreversible, making it difficult if not impossible
to grant effective relief).10 2 But most courts, despite the few
situations in which a stay is required, have adopted the policy
that "[tlhe party who appeals without seeking to avail himself
10 3
of that protection does so at his own risk."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took this view in the
case of In re Roberts Farms, Inc.10 4 The appellants in In re
Roberts Farms, Inc., requested a writ of mandamus and stay
from implementation from the district court immediately
following the bankruptcy court's judgment.10 5
When the
district court denied both requests, the appellants filed an

100. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2000) ("The district courts of the United States shall
have jurisdiction to hear appeals (1) from final judgments, orders and decrees;
and.... of bankruptcy judges ....
).
101. "A stay not sought, and a stay sought and denied, lead equally to the
implementation of the plan of reorganization." In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d
766, 770 (7th Cir. 1994).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2000).
103. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of LTV Aerospace & Def. Co. v.
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 988 F.2d 322, 326 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Unofficial Comm. of Codefendants v. Eagle-Picher Indus. (In re Eagle Pritcher Indus., Inc.), No. 964309, 1998 U.S. App. Lexis 31946, at *16 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 1998) ("[A] party
that elects not to pursue a stay bears the risk that a speedy implementation of a
confirmation order will moot their appeal.").
104. Trone v. Roberts Farms, Inc. (In re Roberts Farms, Inc.), 652 F.2d 793
(9th Cir. 1981).
105. Id. at 795.
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ordinary appeal of the judgment. 11 6 The Ninth Circuit found
that the appeal was equitably moot because the appellants
did not seek a stay from the bankruptcy court. 11 7 The court
stated that "the practical necessities involved in a successful
reorganization require that unless an order of the bankruptcy
judge or the district judge is stayed pending appeal, the
trustee's acts in accordance with that order should not
thereafter be subject to reversal, even if the order is
subsequently overturned on appeal." 08
The court
acknowledged that its decision placed "a heavy burden" on
bankruptcy appellants. °9
The equitable mootness doctrine is also applied, however,
even where the appellant unsuccessfully attempts to obtain a
stay. The In re Public Service Co. case"0 suggests that a high
level of persistence is required to preserve the right to have
the merits heard on appeal. In the case of In re Public Service
Co., the shareholders of the debtor company objected to a
reorganization plan on the basis that it violated Bankruptcy
Code § 1129.1
Bankruptcy Code § 1129 requires that
creditors receive at least as much under the reorganization
plan as they would if the debtor were liquidated in a Chapter
Seven bankruptcy. 1 2 The shareholders filed a motion to stay
implementation of the plan in bankruptcy court, which was
denied.'1 ' The shareholders did not appeal the denial, but
instead appealed the order confirming the reorganization
plan and requested a stay from the district court (which was
rejected)." 4 The appeal was ultimately declared equitably
moot, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the

106. Id.
107. The fact that the appellants sought a stay from the district court in this
case was inapposite, because former Bankruptcy Rule 805 required motions for
stay to be directed first to the bankruptcy judge. Although the current
bankruptcy rule governing stays pending appeal (Rule 8005) does not contain
similar language, analogous requirements exist in other bankruptcy statutes.
In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 569 n.5 (1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).
108. In re Roberts Farms Inc., 652 F.2d at 797 (quoting Bennett v. Gemmill
(In re Combined Metals Reduction Co.), 557 F.2d 179, 189 (9th Cir. 1977)).
109. Id. at 798.
110. Rochman v. Ne. Utils. Serv. Group (In re Pub. Serv. Co.), 963 F.2d 469
(1st Cir. 1992).
111. In re Pub. Serv. Co., 963 F.2d at 470-71.
112. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2000).
113. In re Pub. Serv. Co., 963 F.2d at 470-71.
114. Id. at 471.

268

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:49

appellants' failure to appeal the bankruptcy judge's denial of
their motion for stay allowed the reorganization to "to proceed
to a point well beyond any practicable appellate
annulment."1 15 A Fifth Circuit case also suggests that a high
level of persistence in obtaining a stay is required.
In the case of In re U.S. Brass Corp., the appellants
requested a stay from the bankruptcy court the same day the
order confirming the reorganization plan went into effect.1" 6
The bankruptcy court held a hearing on the stay motion
several months later, but never ruled on the motion, and the
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's confirmation of
the reorganization plan." 7 Shortly thereafter, the appellants
filed an appeal with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and
filed motions for stay and expedited review with the district
court.""8 Several months after requesting a stay from the
district court (which was never ruled upon), the appellants
requested a stay from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 1 9
The bankruptcy and district courts' failure to rule on the stay
motions left the parties without a decision to appeal-an
obvious problem. At the court of appeals, the appellees
argued that the appellants had not been diligent in their
efforts to obtain a stay. 2 ° The court sidestepped the issue of
diligence, merely stating that the failure or inability to obtain
a stay carries the risk that review might be precluded on
mootness grounds, and it is undisputed that the appellants
21
failed to obtain a stay.
A. In re Continental Airlines
Problems with the doctrine of equitable mootness are
evidenced by an important Third Circuit case. An appeal to
the district court in the case of In re ContinentalAirlines was
dismissed for equitable mootness without review on the
merits.' 22 A three-judge panel in the Third Circuit initially

115. Id. at 473.
116. Ins. Subrogation Claimants v. U.S. Brass Corp. (In re U.S. Brass Corp.),
169 F.3d 957, 959 (5th Cir. 1999).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 959-60.
121. Id. at 960.
122. In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 1996).
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affirmed the district court's dismissal by a vote of two to
one.' 2 3 On rehearing en banc, the district court's dismissal
24
was again affirmed by a close vote of seven to six.'
The appellants in In re Continental Airlines were four
separate banks serving as trustees for certificate holders who
had provided Continental with operating capital. 125 The
certificates were secured by a pool of commercial aircraft and
engines, which Continental continued to use throughout the
bankruptcy proceedings. 1 26 Alleging that the collateral had
declined in market value, the trustees filed motions for
adequate protection, relief from the automatic stay,'2 7
renewed motion for adequate protection, and a bond posted by
28
Continental to cover the decline in value.
Continental's efforts to reorganize continued while the
trustees awaited a ruling on their motions.' 29 During that
time, Continental entered into an investment agreement
whereby the investors would provide $450 million, subject to
certain conditions. 30 One of the conditions was a limitation
of the amount and nature of liabilities and administrative
claims to be assumed by the newly reorganized
Continental. 13 ' At the confirmation hearing, Continental's
expert witness testified that the investors would be permitted
to walk away from the deal if the newly reorganized
Continental were to remain liable for the trustees' claim. 132
Continental urged the bankruptcy judge to incorporate the
adjudication of the trustees' claim into the confirmation
133
order, thereby giving the investors an order to rely upon.
The trustees argued against incorporation, contending that
the amount of the claim was a separate matter that could be
34
adjudicated after confirmation of the plan.
The bankruptcy court denied the trustees' motions and
123. Id.
124. See id. at 567.
125. Id. at 555.
126. Id.
127. Id. See discussion supra Part II.B for more information on the function
of an automatic stay in bankruptcy proceedings.
128. In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 556.
129. Id.
130. Id.

131. Id.
132. Id. at 563.
133. Id.
134. In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 1996).
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confirmed Continental's reorganization plan in one action.1 35
The court denied the first motion for adequate protection for
failure to request relief from the automatic stay first.1 36 The
court denied the renewed motion for adequate protection
because the court found that the collateral had not declined in
value since the relevant date-the day the motion for relief
37
from automatic stay was filed.'
The trustees requested a stay pending appeal, which was
heard in the district court due to the unavailability of the
bankruptcy judge. 3
The district court opined that the
trustees were likely to prevail on appeal, but denied the stay
because the trustees were unable to post a satisfactory
bond. 139 The trustees did not appeal denial of the stay, and
Continental's investors closed the transaction by making the
promised investment. 4 °
The trustees appealed the bankruptcy court's orders: (1)
denying the trustees' renewed motion for adequate protection,
(2) confirming Continental's reorganization plan, and (3)
denying the trustees' motion to establish a cash deposit.'
The court found that the investors relied on the unstayed
plan and was convinced that substantial consummation of the
plan prevented the court from providing effective relief.'42 At
the time the district court considered the appeal, all elements
of the reorganization plan, save distributions to unsecured
creditors, had been completed. 4 3 The district court dismissed
the trustees' appeal as equitably moot without reaching the
44
merits. 1
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals described the
questions raised by the bankruptcy court's holding as
"interesting and challenging," but would address those
135. Id.
136. Id. at 557.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. There was apparently a dispute as to the required amount of the bond.
The trustees contended that the district court required a $450 million bond,
while the district court believed the trustees were unwilling to post a bond in
any amount. Id. at 562.
140. In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 1996).
141. Id. at 555.
142. Nationsbank of Tenn. v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc. (In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc.),
No. 93-195-JJF, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18535, at *4-5 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 1993).
143. Id. at *5.
144. Id. at *7.
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questions only if satisfied that the district court erred in

finding the trustees' appeal equitably moot. 145 The appellate
court held that equitable mootness involved a discretionary
weighing of equitable and prudential factors, and therefore
opted to review the district court's ruling for abuse of
discretion.' 4 6 Under this less than rigorous standard, the
court affirmed the dismissal, noting the district court's
finding that the investors had relied on the bankruptcy
court's unstayed Confirmation Order and that there was an
integral nexus between the investment and the success of the
Plan.14 7
1.

Dissenting Opinion

Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito, then a member of
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote an extensive
dissent, joined by five other members of the court. 48 He
described equitable mootness as "permitting federal district
courts and courts of appeals to refuse to entertain the merits
of live bankruptcy appeals over which they indisputably
possess statutory jurisdiction and in which they can plainly
provide relief."' 4 9 Judge Alito argued that the majority
interpreted the doctrine of equitable mootness much too
broadly, depriving the trustees of their right to review by an
Article III court, a right that was "particularly compelling"
50
under the circumstances of this case.
Noting several problems created by the holding, the
dissent argued that the dangers of adopting a broad
interpretation of equitable mootness are evidenced by this
case.15 ' The most obvious danger in dismissing an appeal
without reaching the merits is denying relief to appellants
who are legally entitled to a judgment in their favor. In this
case, the majority described the merits of the trustees' claim
as interesting and challenging, and the district court said
that the trustees probably would have won had the merits of

145. In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 557.
146. Id. at 560.
147. Id. at 564.
148. Id. at 567 (Alito, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 567-68.
151. In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 567 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
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their appeal been reached.1 52 This suggests that the trustees
may have been denied relief that they were legally entitled to.
The dissent also took issue with the standard of review
adopted by the majority. The dissent cited several prior
Third Circuit opinions stating that review of a district court's
order in bankruptcy cases is plenary because the district
court sits as an appellate court in bankruptcy appeals.15 3
Apart from precedential authority, the dissent reasoned that
plenary review is appropriate in equitable mootness cases
because an appellate court is in just as good of a position to
decide the issue as the district court. It is certainly debatable
whether the district court's dismissal would have been
affirmed under a more exacting standard of review than
abuse of discretion.
The dissent and the majority reached different
conclusions about the court's ability to fashion effective
relief-an issue lying at the heart of the dispute underlying
equitable mootness. The majority, reviewing the district
court's ruling for abuse of discretion, accepted the district
court's contention that reversing the confirmation order
would likely throw Continental back into bankruptcy."' The
trustees asserted that they could pay the claim out of the
amount allowed for administrative claims; an option limited,
but not eliminated, by Continental's agreement with its
investors. 55 The majority responded that the bankruptcy
court ruled the trustees had no claim for decline in the
collateral's value. The trustees therefore did not have an
allowed claim, and consequently Continental did not have to
15 6
pay them.
This is somewhat circular reasoning, because if the
appeal were allowed, then the trustees might have a claim for
payment out of the allowed amount. The dissent insisted that
some lesser form of relief could be fashioned without
upsetting the reorganization, and that the reliance interests
should weigh against the amount of the relief, rather than a
'
threshold question of mootness. 57
If the trustees had won on
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 568.
Id. at 568, n.4.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 565-66.
In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J.,
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the merits, then the court might have taken
the reliance
158
remedy.
a
deciding
in
account
into
interests
The final point of dispute between the majority and
dissent related to reliance. The dissent expressed skepticism
over the investors' reliance interest, since they likely
considered the risks of the trustees' pending appeal when
deciding whether or not to lend to Continental.'5 9 The
majority addressed this point by making the reliance test not
whether the investors actually relied on confirmation of the
plan, but whether as a policy matter a court ought to
encourage reliance on a confirmed reorganization plan. 6 ° In
adopting a policy that encourages reliance, the majority
implicitly
decided
that
certainty
in
bankruptcy
reorganizations is more compelling than a litigant's right to
review on the merits before an Article III court.
The doctrine of equitable mootness deprives litigants of
the constitutionally granted right to have claims heard by an
independent judiciary. The doctrine began with a narrow
application, but appellate courts have since expanded it
beyond what is constitutionally permissible. 6' 1 The factors
that courts use to decide issues of equitable mootness are
effectively within the control of the bankruptcy judge. This
allows the bankruptcy judge to control the outcome of an
equitable mootness analysis, and therefore the district court's
decision on whether to consider an appeal. 1 62 Even the
diligent appellant has little control over the presence of
equitable mootness factors. Parties with a high likelihood of
success on the merits of their appeal, like the trustees in In re
Continental Airlines, are most harmed by the doctrine, but
any litigant with a non-frivolous appeal also suffers material
63
harm.1
B. The Legitimacy of EquitableMootness
The doctrine of equitable mootness arguably evolved from

dissenting).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 572.
160. Id. at 565.
161. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
162. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
163. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
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the holding in In re Roberts Farms, Inc.'64 Although the
opinion is somewhat opaque,' 65 it appears that the court in In
re Roberts Farms, Inc. dismissed the appeal for failure to
obtain a stay on two separate grounds. First, the appellants
were required by Bankruptcy Rule 805166 to obtain a stay
pending appeal.167 Rather than creating a new burden on
appellants, Rule 805 "declared existing law," which required
an appeal to be dismissed when it was impossible to grant
relief.168 Second, the appellants failed to diligently pursue a
stay, thereby causing the events that would later make it
169
inequitable for the court to consider the appeal.
The In re Roberts Farms, Inc. court relied on Rule 805
and a Supreme Court ruling in determining that a stay was
required."7 ° In Mills v. Green, the Supreme Court ruled that
an appeal should be dismissed when events occur pending
appeal that render it "impossible ... to grant [the appellant]
any effectual relief."' 71 Rule 805 required a stay to be
obtained to prevent certain irreversible transactions from
17 2
occurring, thereby rendering it impossible to grant relief.
The Mills case and Rule 805 concern constitutional mootness,
rather than equitable mootness. 17' In quoting Mills and Rule
805, the court in In re Roberts Farms, Inc. suggested that the
appellant's failure to obtain a stay rendered the appeal
constitutionally moot, because a large number of irreversible
transactions had taken place, making it impossible for the
court to grant any effective relief.1 74 A basic requirement of
constitutional standing is that the court must be capable of at
least partially addressing or remedying the injury suffered by
a complainant or appellant. '
Litigants alleging non-

164. In

re Cont'l Airlines,

91 F.3d 553, 569 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J.,

dissenting).
165. See id.
166. Bankruptcy Rule 805 has since been re-codified into several different
statutes. Id.
167. Trone v. Roberts Farms, Inc. (In re Roberts Farms, Inc.), 652 F.2d 793,
795 (9th Cir. 1981).
168. Id. at 796.
169. Id. at 798.
170. Id. at 797.
171. Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895).
172. In re Roberts Farms, Inc., 652 F.2d at 796.
173. See discussion supra Part II.B.
174. See In re Roberts Farms,Inc., 652 F.2d at 798.
175. Cynthia L. Fountaine, Article III and the Adequate and Independent
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redressable injuries do176 not have constitutional standing
before Article III courts.
Dismissal for equitable mootness was "an entirely
separate and independent ground for dismissal."17 7 The In re
Roberts Farms, Inc. court held that a party who fails to
diligently pursue available remedies waives an appeal. As a
result, the party "permits such a comprehensive change of
circumstances to occur as to render it inequitable for this
The court
court to consider the merits of the appeal." 17
stated the "thrust" of the opinion is that an appellant has an
obligation in some situations to diligently pursue all available
remedies to stay an objectionable order.'7 9 Rather than
suggesting constitutional mootness, this statement reflects
the equitable principle that an appellant who sleeps on his
rights may be denied relief as a consequence of doing so. 8 0
This principle has been well established in the law for
centuries.
The rule announced by the In re Roberts Farms, Inc.
court suggests a narrower interpretation of equitable
mootness than the interpretation adopted by the Third
The wording of the In re Roberts Farms, Inc.
Circuit.'
opinion implies that an appeal will not be mooted if the
appellant pursues available remedies with diligence. 8 2 This
is contrary to the effective rule adopted by the other circuits,
which considers the act of obtaining a stay to be necessary,
but not sufficient, to prevent a dismissal for equitable
mootness.' 8 3 Because most circuits have instituted a de facto
8 4
requirement that appellants obtain a stay pending appeal,
the appellate courts have extended the doctrine significantly

State Grounds Doctrine, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1053, 1080 (1999).
176. See id.
177. In re Roberts Farms, Inc., 652 F.2d at 797.
178. Id. at 798.
179. Id.
180. E.g., James S. Sable, A Chapter 13 Debtor's Right to Cure Default Under
Section 1322(b): A Problem of Interpretation,57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 127, 138 n.72
(1983).
181. See In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 570 (3d Cir. 1996).
182. By arguing that lack of diligence in pursuing remedies causes equitable
mootness, the court implicitly says that diligently pursuing remedies would
have saved the appeal from equitable mootness. In re Roberts Farms, Inc., 652
F.2d at 798.
183. See discussion supra Parts III-IV.
184. See discussion supra Parts III-IV.
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since the In re Roberts Farms,Inc. case. In summary, the In
re Roberts Farms, Inc. court has adopted a viewpoint that
recognizes the equitable mootness doctrine as legitimate, but
limits its application so as to reduce the risk of unfairness to
an appealing party.'
C. FactorsWithin the Control of the Bankruptcy Court
Most circuits have adopted an equitable mootness
analysis that is very similar to the Third Circuit's five-factor
test. 8 6 Courts examine (1) whether a stay has been obtained,
(2) whether the plan has been substantially consummated, (3)
whether the relief requested would affect the rights of parties
not before the court, (4) whether the relief requested would
affect the success of the reorganization plan, and sometimes,
(5) the public policy considerations in giving finality to
87
bankruptcy judgments."
The first two factors overlap,
because if a stay has been obtained it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to substantially consummate the reorganization
plan.
The bankruptcy judge has significant control over the
first two factors, and control to a much lesser extent over the
fourth factor. The appellant must ordinarily request a stay
from the bankruptcy court before requesting one from the
district or appellate court. 8 8 The bankruptcy court can deny
the stay, or simply fail to rule as the bankruptcy court in the

185. It is important to note the difference between transactions contemplated
by Rule 805 (now contemplated by Bankruptcy Code sections 363(m) and
364(e)), and transactions not mentioned in the statutes. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m)
(2000); 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) (2000).
The former transactions cannot be reversed, leaving courts without the
power to grant effective relief. § 363(m); § 364(e). Therefore, appeals requesting
reversal of the transactions are constitutionally moot. All other transactions,
however, can be reversed, giving appellate courts the power to grant effective
relief. Therefore, these transactions are not constitutionally moot, but they may
nonetheless be equitably moot.
186. The majority in In re Continental Airlines purports to be adopting
equitable mootness as adopted by its "sister circuits," citing cases from the
Fifth, Seventh, Second, First, Eleventh, Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. In re
Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 558-59 (3d Cir. 1996).
187. See, e.g., In re GWI PCS 1, Inc., 230 F.3d 788, 800 (5th Cir. 2000); First
Union Real Estate Equity & Mortgage Invs. v. Club Assocs. (In re Club Assocs.),
956 F.2d 1065, 1069 n.11 (11th Cir. 1992); Rochman v. Ne. Utils. Serv. Group,
(In re Public Service Co.) 963 F.2d 469, 471-73 (1st Cir. 1992).
188. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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In re U.S. Brass Corp. case did."8 9 Because a bankruptcy
judge has control over most factors of the test, the bankruptcy
judge can effectively control the outcome of the test, and
therefore whether an appeal is deemed equitably moot.
The timing of the bankruptcy court's ruling on the
appellant's motion for stay, assuming the court rules at all,
allows the bankruptcy judge to control consummation of the
reorganization plan. Absent an order to stay implementation
of the plan pending appeal, all parties involved are likely to
begin taking actions to further the plan. 190 Each day that the
bankruptcy judge delays in his ruling allows additional
actions to be taken in reliance on the plan. Appeals are
frequently scheduled several months after confirmation of the
plan, making it very likely that an unstayed reorganization
plan will be substantially consummated by the time the
appeal reaches an Article III court. 9
In contrast, the bankruptcy judge has very limited
control over whether the appellant's requested relief will
affect the success of the reorganization plan, though more so
than the appellant at the outset. However, in deciding to
affirm a fragile reorganization plan (i.e., a plan likely to fail
with minimal tampering), the bankruptcy judge can limit an
appellant's options for relief.'9 2 The judge can also make
specific findings of fact that suggest disruption of the plan
would affect the success of the reorganization. 193
A
bankruptcy judge's ability to make specific findings of fact
and affirm a fragile reorganization plan give the bankruptcy

189. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Hope v. Gen. Fin. Corp. (In re Kahihikolo), 807 F.2d 1540, 1542
(11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) ("[I]n the absence of a stay, action of a character
which cannot be reversed by the court of appeals may be taken in reliance on
the lower court's decree.").
191. See, e.g., Ins. Subrogation Claimants v. U.S. Brass Corp. (In re U.S.
Brass Corp.), 169 F.3d 957, 959 (5th Cir. 1999).
192. The appellant has more control at the district court level, because he/she
can choose to request relief that will not affect the success of the reorganization.
The bankruptcy judge has more control at the outset, however, because the
judge limits an appellant's range of relief options by confirming a particularly
fragile reorganization plan.
193. The bankruptcy court in In re ContinentalAirlines specifically found, for
example, that the appellants' claim was not an allowed administrative claim,
and therefore the allowed administrative claims to be paid by the newly
reorganized Continental would be within the cap the investors demanded as
part of the plan. In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 563 (3d Cir. 1996).
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judge some control over the third factor, though not much.
D. The Effect of Failureto Obtain a Stay
The net effect of the precedent relating to equitable
mootness is that the various circuits have, as a practical
matter, conditioned a litigant's right to review by an Article
III court on whether the litigant has obtained a stay. 194
Initially, courts suggested that it was a litigant's failure to
request a stay that allowed the parties to develop a reliance
on the reorganization plan, mooting the appeal. 195 But in
cases where the appellants attempted unsuccessfully to
obtain a stay, the courts have reluctantly admitted that the
effect is the same, finding the appeal moot in those cases as
well. 1 96 This is problematic because the bankruptcy court has
control over whether a stay is granted or not. As discussed
above, failure to obtain a stay will usually result in
substantial consummation of the bankruptcy plan. A shrewd
potential appellee may even rush to implement the
reorganization plan, knowing that doing so will make it
possible for the potential appellee to argue equitable
mootness.
The five-factor equitable mootness analysis operates such
that, in an unstayed reorganization, the district court nearly
always finds the other factors present. When an entity
reorganizes, it frequently enters into new business contracts
and relationships based on the plan.' 97 Presumably, only the
debtor and creditor advancing the dispute typically come
before the court on appeal, making it likely that granting
relief would affect the rights of parties not before the court.
The question of whether granting relief is likely to affect the
success of reorganization can be highly speculative, and
therefore grants the district court great leeway in deciding
whether to hear an appeal on the merits. 98 The last possible
194. See discussion supra Part III.
195. See, e.g., supra note 103 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., supra note 110 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 566.
198. In the In re Continental Airlines dissent, Judge Alito stated that in
order to find that effective relief could not be granted, the majority would have
to show that it could not grant the appellants one dollar of relief without
upsetting the bankruptcy plan. Id. at 571 (Alito, J., dissenting). The question
of course is not whether any relief could be granted, but whether any
meaningful relief could be granted, which is part of why that inquiry is highly
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factor, public policy considerations in giving finality to
bankruptcy judgments will, by nature, always be present.
The bankruptcy code generally does not require
appellants to seek a stay pending appeal, but failure to do so
may rob litigants of a constitutional right.199 The effect of the
circuit courts' decisions is that the litigant wishing to
preserve an appeal must (1) request a stay, (2) request a writ
of mandamus ordering the bankruptcy court to rule on the
motion for a stay if it fails to do so after a short period of
time, and (3) appeal from the ruling denying a stay.2 0 But
even taking those actions does not guarantee appellants
review by an Article III court.0 1 In short, while a litigant is
not required to obtain a stay pending appeal in theory, in
reality the litigant must do so to preserve the right to review
by an Article III court.
E. Statutory Issue
In refusing to hear the merits of a case on equitable
mootness grounds, the district courts are shirking their
obligation under the bankruptcy statute. While the statute
gives district courts the option of delegating certain
responsibilities to bankruptcy courts, they have a duty to
supervise the actions of those courts.2 2
Doing so is
particularly important in this case because the sole remedy of
bankruptcy parties facing an unjust ruling is an appeal to the
district court.20 3 Congress vested the district courts with
original and exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy claims.20 4
In light of the district courts' virtually unflagging obligation
to exercise the jurisdiction granted to them,0 5 they should not
speculative. The other part that makes the inquiry highly speculative is a
judge's inherent lack of omniscience that would allow the judge to determine the
impact of a particular dollar amount on the success of a bankruptcy
reorganization.
199. In re Joshua Slocum, Ltd., 922 F.2d 1081, 1085 (3d Cir. 1990).
200. Numerous decisions criticized appellants for failing to request a stay,
failing to request a writ of mandamus ordering sluggish courts to rule on the
request, and failing to appeal a ruling denying the stay. E.g., Trone v. Roberts
Farms, Inc. (In re Roberts Farms, Inc.), 652 F.2d 793, 795 (9th Cir. 1981).
201. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 41.
204. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2000).

205. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976).
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be refusing to consider the merits of non-frivolous appeals
from the bankruptcy courts.
F. ConstitutionalIssue
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 implicated both
separation of powers issues and litigants' rights issues. The
law involved an attempt by the legislative branch to control
the exercise of Article III judicial power. With cases involving
equitable mootness, however, it is the judicial branch, not the
legislative branch, that chooses not to exercise Article III
power. This helps to ameliorate issues involving separation
of powers and constitutional structure of government, but the
litigants' rights issues raised by the denial of Article III
review largely remain. Both the bankruptcy courts and the
district courts contribute to the problem.
Bankruptcy courts contribute to the problem by
effectively exercising control over whether a litigant has the
opportunity to present the merits of his or her case before the
district court. The doctrine of equitable mootness as applied
places a litigant's right to review by an Article III court, as a
practical matter, within the discretion of an Article I
bankruptcy court. The circuit courts' adoption of the fivefactor analysis, which places an emphasis on obtaining a stay
from the bankruptcy court, effectively allows bankruptcy
court rulings to determine the outcome of an equitable
mootness inquiry. Even the diligent appellant has little
control over the presence of equitable mootness factors.
Dismissals for equitable mootness in cases where the
appellant sought a stay unsuccessfully are particularly
unfair, making "equitable mootness" something of a
misnomer.
District courts contribute to the problem by refusing to
supervise the bankruptcy courts. Federal courts have a
"virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise the jurisdiction
given to them. °6 In dismissing an appeal for equitable
mootness without reaching the merits, the district court is
essentially abstaining from exercising its jurisdiction,20 7

206. Id.
207. The doctrine of abstention is only applicable by analogy, but essentially
dictates that a federal court may decline to exercise jurisdiction only in
exceptional circumstances.
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contrary to their obligation to do so. A broad interpretation of
equitable mootness enables the courts to refrain from
exercising the power vested in them by statute and the U.S.
Constitution. In doing so, the district courts leave review of
litigants' rights in the hands of an Article I court,
unconstitutionally depriving litigants of the right to have
claims decided by an Article III court.
G. How a Sophisticated Party Might Work the System
In a contentious bankruptcy proceeding, a party who
finds themselves in the same position as Continental Airlines
has the opportunity to make things harder for its creditors. If
the bankruptcy court refuses to grant a stay pending appeal,
the uncooperative debtor can move quickly to implement the
reorganization, relying on the plan to the greatest extent
possible. If the reorganization plan prefers some creditors to
others, or the plan is heavily slanted in favor of the debtor,
the debtor may take any opportunity to deprive the opposing
party of an appeal. This opportunity should rarely arise, but
on the occasion that a bankruptcy court renders a series of
unjust decisions2"' and the district court refuses to hear the
appeal, an uncooperative debtor can exacerbate the problem
caused by equitable mootness.
V. PROPOSAL
As it currently stands, the doctrine of equitable mootness
allows litigants' claims to be ultimately decided by an Article
I court, without an opportunity for review by an Article III
court.2" 9
This problem stems both from the actions of
bankruptcy courts, and the district courts' failure to supervise
the bankruptcy courts, in spite of their obligation to do so.
Although the public policy arguments in favor of encouraging
reliance on bankruptcy rulings are substantial,210 such
arguments cannot outweigh a constitutional right. Because
the doctrine of equitable mootness and the courts'
interpretation as it currently stands deprives litigants of their
208. Blessing a reorganization plan that fails to protect a party's rights,
failing to hear and/or decide a request for stay pending appeal in a timely
fashion, refusing to grant a stay pending appeal, and likely denying other
requests for relief along the way.
209. See discussion supra Part IV.C-D.
210. In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 555 (3d Cir. 1996).
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constitutional right to have claims reviewed by an
independent judiciary, some manner of reform is necessary.
The best way to remedy the problems created by
equitable mootness is to craft a more effective and timely
process for obtaining a stay pending appeal. The circuit
courts have made clear that obtaining an order to stay
implementation of a financial reorganization pending appeal
is crucial to the preservation of that appeal. 21 ' Further,
timely entry of a stay order would prevent all parties from
developing reliance interests on the reorganization plan,
allowing courts on appeal to grant relief without requiring
them to "unscramble the eggs" 212 of a substantially
consummated reorganization plan.
The enactment of two simple procedural rules within
Title 11 of the U.S. Code could fix the problem. The first rule
would establish an automatic stay pending appeal, which
would become effective as a matter of law immediately when
an appeal was filed. To reduce time delays, appellants
wishing to take advantage of the automatic stay would be
required to file an appeal within ten days of the bankruptcy
court's confirmation of a reorganization plan. An automatic
stay effective on the prompt filing of an appeal would reward
appellants who diligently pursue their stay remedies, while at
the same time place very little burden on other interested
parties. Waiting ten days to see if an appeal is filed before
implementing a reorganization plan should have a de
minimis effect on the success of the plan. Waiting several
months, however, may have a more sizeable effect,
necessitating a second rule.
The second rule would require district courts to decide
appeals from the bankruptcy court's confirmation of a
reorganization plan within sixty days of filing.
As
bankruptcy reorganization proceedings often last several
months,2 13 waiting an additional sixty days to begin
implementing a reorganization plan should not substantially
affect the success of the reorganization. In cases where the
additional sixty-day period would substantially diminish a
211. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
212. In re Cont'l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 566.
213. See Joseph F. Rice & Nancy W. Davis, The Future of Mass Tort Claims:
Comparison of Settlement Class Action to Bankruptcy Treatment of Mass Tort
Claims, 50 S.C. L. REV. 405, 441 (1999).
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debtor's likelihood of successfully emerging as a newly
reorganized entity, the appellee could request an emergency
ruling from the district court on the merits of the appeal. The
district court should be willing to grant such a request,
assuming a speedy ruling is warranted by the circumstances.
Enactment of these two rules would provide a reasonable
balancing of the interests involved. The automatic stay
pending appeal would prevent substantial consummation of
the reorganization plan and reliance interests from forming,
ensuring that the appellant's case is not dismissed for
equitable mootness. The requirement that district courts rule
on the merits of an appeal from confirmation of a
reorganization plan within sixty days would limit the burden
on parties for whom a speedy reorganization is important.
Although the automatic stay pending appeal and directive to
rule on the merits within sixty days would not apply to the
subsequent circuit court appeal, the constitutional problems
with equitable mootness would have already been eliminated
by giving appellants an opportunity to be heard on the merits
at the district court level. The Constitution requires such an
opportunity, and enactment of the two procedural rules
discussed above would preserve litigants' right to be heard by
an Article III court.
VI. CONCLUSION
The right of a litigant to have his case considered by an
independent judge is an essential constitutional right and
must be preserved in order to protect both the rights of
litigants and the fundamental constitutional structure of
American government. The Supreme Court of the United
States has ruled that Article III of the U.S. Constitution
requires the essential attributes of judicial power to be
exercised exclusively by the judicial branch of government.
The doctrine of equitable mootness, however, places review by
an Article III court effectively within the discretion of an
Article I court, thereby depriving litigants of their
constitutional right to review by an independent judiciary.21 4
A litigant's inability to obtain a stay pending appeal
fundamentally contributes to the constitutional problem.
When a debtor's reorganization plan is implemented, it
214. See discussion supra Part IV.F.
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results in events or transactions occurring which equitably
"moot" the litigant's appeal. 215 The solution is to balance the
interests of the various parties by crafting a more effective
and timely process for obtaining a stay pending appeal, which
would prevent such events or transactions from occurring in
the first place.216
This could be accomplished by the
implementation of two simple procedural rules that place a
minimal burden on all of the parties, while honoring the
litigant's right to review by an Article III court. 217 The
recommended rules should be adopted to give a litigant the
ability to obtain a stay pending appeal independently,
thereby preserving the right to review by an independent
judiciary and resolving the constitutional issue created by the
doctrine of equitable mootness.

215. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
216. See discussion supra Part V.
217. See discussion supra Part V.

